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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1993 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or repealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia (the code). In
addition to this legislation, there were five cases from the Supreme
Court of Virginia in the year ending June 1, 1993 which involve
issues of interest to both the general practitioner and the specialist
in wills, trusts, and estates. This article analyzes each of these legislative and judicial developments.'
II.

1993

LEGISLATION

A. Notice of Probate
Virginia law offers the proponent of a will four methods for its
probate: inter partes probate, quasi inter partes probate, ex parte
probate in the circuit court, and ex parte probate before the clerk
of the circuit court. The latter method, ex parte probate before
the clerk of the circuit court, has proven to be the overwhelming
favorite3 because of its simplicity, speed and economy.
In recent years, however, an evolving concept of due process in
probate matters has generated a genuine apprehension that the
"no-notice" aspect of Virginia's ex parte probate might be violative
of the minimum notice requirements guaranteed by the Four* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T. C. Williams School of Law; B.A., 1965,
College of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they will be
generally referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1993
supplement for the new sections.
• 2. GEORGE P. SMITH, JR., HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST
VIRGINIA §§ 175(2)-(4) (3d ed. 1985).

3. There are no readily available statistics to prove the exact breakdown in each category,
but the author is familiar with many lawyers who have never probated a will in any other
way, and for those who have, they are quick to admit that it is seldom done.
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teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 A 1988
United States Supreme Court decision discussing due process in a
different probate law context5 convinced the Wills, Trusts and Estates Section of the Virginia Bar Association (VBA) that Virginia's
ex parte probate was constitutionally deficient. Thus, beginning
with the 1989 Session of the General Assembly, the VBA has
worked for the enactment of a notice procedure that would satisfy
due process requirements, and at the same time, preserve as much
as possible of the benefit associated with the historic ex parte
procedure.
The VBA's continuing efforts resulted in this year's enactment
of section 64.1-122.2,1 which provides for after-the-fact notice to
interested parties within thirty days7 following the ex parte probate of a will in a testate case, or the qualification of an administrator in an intestate case.8 The new section, which is applicable to
estates of persons dying on or after January 1, 1994, is divided into
seven paragraphs that (A) identify those entitled to notice, (B)
eliminate the necessity for notice in certain cases, (C) state the information to be contained in the notice, (D) provide for the time
and method of notice, (E) deal with failure to give notice, (F) establish a compliance mechanism, and (G) direct the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court to create a form with instructions to
be used for giving the required notice.9 The nature of this survey
and space limitations preclude a line by line analysis of this new
legislation. Although the new procedure seems reasonable for the
4. For example, although the heirs of a decedent have standing to challenge the validity
of the decedent's will, the competent, resident heirs may only do so within one year of the
will's probate. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1991). Thus, in cases where an heir
doesn't learn of the death until after this one year period, the heir could not successfully
challenge the will (thereby being deprived of a property interest) even though the will's
proponent knew of the heir's existence, knew of the heir's ignorance of the decedent's death,
and intentionally failed to give the heir any notice. A discussion of this and other due process issues in Virginia probate practice will be found in Gary B. Kline, Note, Constitutionality of Notice in Virginia Probate and Estate Administration, 42 WASH. & LEE L. RE v. 1325

(1985).
5. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (dealing with
notice to creditors in the estate settlement process).
6. Act of Feb. 9, 1993, ch. 4, 1993 Va. Acts 3 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2
(Curn. Supp. 1993)).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1993).

8. Id. §§ 64.1-88, to -89 allows a competent resident who was not a party to an ex parte
probate one year from the date thereof to challenge the same. Accordingly, the thirty-day
after-the-fact notice will guarantee at least an eleven month period within which an interested party can challenge the probate action.
9. Id. §§ 64.1-122.2(A)-(G) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
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most part, 10 and its concept of after-the-fact notice clearly preserves the simplicity, speed and economy of the historic ex parte
probate, it remains to be seen whether or not this new concept will
pass constitutional muster. The further question of due process notice requirements in the settlement of decedents' estates and the
administration of testamentary trusts also remains open.1 1 Thus,
prudent counsel should consider giving notice to every person who
has a possible interest, not only in probate, but throughout the
process of settling the estate and the administration of any testamentary trust. One who has received actual notice cannot complain
that such notice was defective because it was not mandated by a

statute.
B.

Fiduciary'sInventory -

Form

Every court appointed fiduciary of another's property is required

to file an inventory with the commissioner of accounts within four

months of appointment.12 Section 26-12 formerly provided that the
property to be included in this inventory was (i) all of the personal
and real estate under the fiduciary's supervision and control, and
(ii) all other property of the estate of which the fiduciary had
knowledge.13 Under amended section 26-12,14 the property to be
10. It seems reasonably clear that the new law does not satisfy due process requirements
in all cases. For instance, in a case where testator has executed a second will, completely
eliminating the beneficiaries under the first, it is clear that any beneficiary under Will I has
standing to contest Will 2. However, the new law provides for notice to the beneficiaries
under Will 1 only if it has been "previously probated in the same court." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-122.2(A)(4) (Cum.Supp. 1993). If the proponent of Will 2 is aware of the existence of
un-probated Will 1 and the identity of the beneficiaries thereunder, it would appear that
the clear language of Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) mandates these beneficiaries' entitlement to notice. In addition, the new law states that notice
need not be provided to anyone "when the known assets passing under the will or by intestacy do not exceed $5,000" VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2(B)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1993), or to a
non-heir who receives a testamentary gift of personalty "not in excess of $5,000." VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-122.2(B)(8) (Cu. Supp. 1993). The latter case discloses an obvious problem in
discriminating against legatees (because there is no comparable provision dispensing with
notice to devisees who receive realty not in excess of $5,000), and although one appreciates
the practical desirability of a de minimis provision, in both cases one needs to remember
that in Tulsa, the major U.S. Supreme Court case discussing due process in the probate
process, the Court does not even mention the amount in issue anywhere in its decision.
11. A discussion of these issues will be found in Constitutionalityof Notice in Virginia
Probate and Estate Administration, supra note 4.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Cur.Supp. 1993).
13. Id. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
14. Act of Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 581, 1993 Va. Acts 730 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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inventoried is reorganized into three categories as follows: (i) all of
the personal estate under the fiduciary's supervision and control; 15
(ii) all real estate over which he has the power of sale; 16 and (iii)
any other real estate of the decedent of which the fiduciary has
17
knowledge.
Corresponding changes are made to the statutorily suggested
forms for inventories contained in amended section 26-12.1.' In
addition to the rearrangement of the forms, the new legislation
also adds several more instructions to the end of the inventory
forms, and these instructions highlight several puzzles. 9 First, instruction no. 5 clearly provides for the inventory to exclude survivorship personalty but instruction no. 6 provides for it to include
survivorship realty, and the obvious question is why the difference?2 0 Second, under the clear language of instruction no 5., joint
accounts with survivorship, Totten trust accounts, and P.O.D. accounts in financial institutions need not be listed on the inventory.
Yet, where other estate assets are insufficient, a decedent's interest
in such accounts is liable for all estate needs other than satisfying
15. Thus, the amendment removes real estate from the "supervision and control" category. This category of personal property will be included on schedule I of the amended
statutorily suggested inventory form contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.1 (Cum. Supp.
1993).
16. The language focusing on "real estate over which he has a power of sale" is in lieu of
the earlier deleted "real estate which is under his supervision and control." This category of
property will be included on schedule II of the amended statutorily suggested inventory
form contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
17. This category of property will be included on Schedule III of the amended statutorily
suggested inventory form contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.1 (Cure. Supp. 1993).
18. Act of Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 581, 1993 Va. Acts 730 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-12.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993) provides in part as follows:
INSTRUCTIONS TO FIDUCIARIES AND APPRAISERS
5. Personal property to be listed under Section I includes all assets other than real
estate... and any other property having value ....
Personal property which was
held by the decedent and surviving spouse as tenants by the entirety or by the decedent and a surviving co-owner as joint tenants with right of survivorship or personal
property payable directly to a surviving beneficiary need not be listed.
6. Real estate to be listed under Section III includes real estate over which the personal representative has no power of sale such as property held by the decedent and
another as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entireties or
property which is subject to a direct devise.
Id.
20. It has been suggested that the commissioner of accounts needs to know of survivorship realty because a portion of the real estate taxes thereon might be a proper administrative expense. Accepting this, it is unclear why the commissioner would not also need to
know of an automobile held in survivorship, as to which a portion of the personal property
taxes thereon might be a proper administrative expense.
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testamentary gifts,2 and thus the existence of such accounts would
seem to be of interest to those interested in the estate. Arguably,
disclosure of such accounts was required by the prior law's provision requiring the disclosure of "all other property (emphasis
added) of the estate22 of the decedent of which he has knowledge,"2 3 which was replaced by "all other real estate (emphasis
added) of the decedent of which he has knowledge. '24 Regardless
of whether disclosure of multiple party accounts was required
under prior law, instruction no. 5 clearly states that such disclosure
is not required under the new law.
If this section is to be amended again, there is another reason to
require disclosure of all joint accounts on the inventory. The right
of a party in interest to require a personal representative to pursue
a claim against a joint account on behalf of the estate 5 must be
asserted within six months of the personal representative's qualification.26 In the absence of required disclosure on the inventory
form, the likelihood of interested parties not discovering the existence of such accounts prior to the expiration of the six month limitation period is much greater than if disclosure were required.
C.

Probate Avoidance -

Boat Titles

Over the years, the General Assembly has enacted a number of
statutes to facilitate the transfer of certain property from the dead
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.8 (Repl. Vol. 1988) provides in part that "[n]o multiple party
account will be effective against an estate of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor sums
needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administration, including statutory allowances
to the surviving spouse, minor children and dependent children, if other assets of the estate
are insufficient." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.1.5 (Repl. Vol. 1988) provides in part that a
"'multiple party account' means any of the following types of account: (i) a joint account,
(ii) a P.O.D. account, or (iii) a [Totten] trust account."
22. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 581,
1993 Va. Acts 730 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Cum. Supp. 1993)). Some would
argue that disclosure was not required under prior law because that law focused on "other
property of the estate" and money in multiple party accounts, which are regarded as classic
"probate-avoidance" concepts, and would not be considered assets "of the estate." VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (emphasis added). The rejoinder to this argument is that the
language in VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.8 (Repl. Vol. 1988), making these assets reachable, does
so only if "other assets of the estate" are insufficient. By referring to other assets of the
estate, this code section is implying that these assets are also assets of the estate, else why
the reference to other assets "of the estate"?
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of Mar. 25, 1993, Ch 581,
1993 Va. Acts 730 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Va. Supp. 1993)).
24. Id. § 26-12 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
25. On the grounds, for example, that survivorship was not intended by the decedent.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-140 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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to the living without the necessity of going through the probate
process. 27 The 1993 addition to this list is section 29.1-717.3, dealing with watercraft for which a title has been issued by the Virginia Department of Game, Inland Fisheries and Boating.2 8 Pursuant to this section, in cases where there is no qualification upon
the estate of a decedent who owned such a watercraft, title thereto
29
will be transferred by the department upon the request of one
who (i) takes the watercraft or an interest therein by testate or
intestate succession from the decedent, and (ii) makes a statement
containing certain information to the department."0 This statute
will be very helpful in those cases where the only titled asset is a
watercraft and where, in the past, there would have to be a qualification on the estate so that an administrator or executor could effect the necessary transfer."'
D.

Settlement of Fiduciary Accounts

1. General. Generally, former section 26-1732 required all court
appointed fiduciaries of another's property to file an annual accounting with the commissioner of accounts for each fiscal year,
beginning with the date of appointment, (i) showing all receipts
and disbursements during the accounting period, (ii) displaying
vouchers to support all disbursements, and (iii) containing a statement of cash on hand, cash in bank, and securities held at the end
27. Among the most frequently used of these statutes are VA. CoDE ANN. § 46.2-634
(Repl. Vol. 1989) (dealing with title to a motor vehicle); § 6.1-71 (Repl. Vol. 1988) dealing
with small deposits in banks); § 6.1-194.58 (Repl. Vol. 1988) (dealing with small deposits in
savings and loan associations); and § 6.1-225.4& (Cum. Supp. 1993) (dealing with small deposits in credit unions).
28. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 675, 1993 Va. Acts 955 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1717.3 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
29. Any other persons having an interest in the watercraft, if of legal age, must also signify their consent to the requested transfer in writing.
30. This statement must contain information
to the effect that there has not been and there is not expected to be a qualification on
the estate and that the decedent's debts have been paid or that the proceeds from the
sale of the watercraft will be applied against his debts . . . the name, residence at
the time of death, and date of death of the decedent, and the names of any other
persons having an interest in the watercraft. ...
VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-717.3 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
31. A parallel provision is found in VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991), dealing
with vessels registered by Virginia residents with the United States Bureau of Customs.
However, that section's remedy is available only if the vessel "has a market value not exceeding $7,000. . . ." Id.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17 (Repl. Vol. 1992), repealed by Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689,
1993 Va. Acts 969.
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of the accounting period. 33 This section further provided that, at
the commissioner's request, the accounting fiduciary was also required to exhibit all securities held, and a statement from every
financial institution in which funds were deposited at the end of
the accounting period, to the commissioner.3 4 The 1993 legislation
repeals section 26-17 and two minor ancillary sections,3 5 and adds
new sub-sections dealing more specifically with the accounting requirements of the various fiduciaries. The nature of this survey
and space limitations preclude a line by line analysis of this new
legislation but each new section is mentioned and, to the extent it
makes any significant change from the historical procedure already
described, such change is noted.
2. Accounting Periods. Section 26-17.3 establishes the general requirement that all covered fiduciaries make accountings before the
commissioner of accounts in the jurisdiction of their qualification. 3
Section 26-17.4, applicable only to guardians, curators, committees,
trustees for ex-service persons and their beneficiaries, and receivers
for minor married women reduces the time period covered by their
first accounting from the first year to the first four months from
qualification.3 7 All subsequent accountings are for one year periods
ending on the anniversary date of the first accounting's termination date. Section 26-17.5, applicable only to personal representatives, retains the historic accounting periods. 38 Section 26-17.6, applicable only to testamentary trustees, changes their annual
accounting period from a fiscal year beginning at the date of their
appointment to a calendar year basis.3 9 Excepted from this change
are (a) testamentary trustees who qualified before July 1, 1993,
and (b) testamentary trusts in which one trustee is (i) a corporation qualified under section 6-1.5, or (ii) permitted by federal law
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993 Va. Acts 969 (repealing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-17,
26-17.1 and 26-17.2). VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.1, Vouchers for payments to the Internal Revenue Service, was re-enacted, verbatim, without title, by Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993
Va. Acts 969 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.9(C) (Cum. Supp. 1993); and VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-17.2, Direct payments to a beneficiary's account, was re-enacted, mutatis mutandis,
without title, by Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993 Va. Acts 969 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-17.9(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
36. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993 Va. Acts 969 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.3
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
37. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.4 (Cune. Supp. 1993)).
38. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.5 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
39. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.6 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:833

to file income tax returns on a fiscal year basis, in which cases the
trustees may continue to file accountings on a fiscal year basis.
3. Waiver of Accountings for Testamentary Trustees. For wills
probated after July 1, 1993, section 26-17.74o recognizes the right of
a testator to expressly waive the trustee's obligation to file accountings with the commissioner 41 if the trustee (i) provides certain of the beneficiaries42 with specified information4 3 within
ninety days of qualification, and (ii) makes an annual accounting
to such beneficiaries upon request. The testator's waiver may be
negated by any of the foregoing beneficiaries 4 4 or the court,4 5 any

of whom may require that annual accountings be filed with the
commissioner. In the case of wills probated prior to July 1, 1993,
which contain appropriate waiver language, the trustee will also be
excused from accounting to the commissioner "with the written
consent of all adult beneficiaries who may be entitled to receive
income or principal at the time such written consent is signed."4
This provision is one of the most harmful pieces of estate legislation to issue from the General Assembly in recent years. Popular
myth sees the accounting process as an unnecessary, time-consuming and unduly expensive procedure. And a case can be made for
this position vis-a-vis trusts being administered by fiduciary institutions and knowledgeable attorneys. But, in this writer's experi40. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
41. The statutorily suggested language is "I hereby direct that my trustee(s) shall not be
required to file annual accounts with a court as otherwise required by Virginia law." VA.
CODE ANN. § 26-17.7(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993). The use of this language is not mandatory and
other language "substantially in form and effect" as the foregoing is also acceptable. Id.
42. This provision reads as follows: "all beneficiaries of the trust who are adults, whose
addresses are known to the trustee and who may then be entitled to receive income or
principal from the trust.. . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993) (emphasis
added). Query: is a beneficiary who may receive income or principal in the absolute discretion of the trustee "entitled" within the meaning of this provision? What if this is the position of all beneficiaries? Suppose, in a case where both parents die prematurely, all current
beneficiaries are minor children. Is anyone entitled to notice in these cases?
43. This provision reads as follows: "provides each with a copy of the applicable provisions of the will; advises each of his right to require an annual accounting; and provides each
with a copy of this code section. . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7(C) (Cum. Supp. 1993), which also permits the negation
power to be exercised by one legally empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary, by a
custodial parent on behalf of a minor, and by a minor who is at least fourteen years old. The
negation power by, or on behalf of, minors may well be illusory because, as noted above, it
appears that the only beneficiaries entitled to a notice of rights are certain adults. VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-17.7(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7(E) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
46. Id. § 26-17.7(D).
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ence, the majority of trusts will be administered by others, mostly
by consumers with no prior trustee experience. However well
meaning and honest these lay trustees may be, their lack of experience greatly increases the likelihood of error.4 7 In such error-prone

cases, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the commissioner's role in verifying that the testator's instructions have been
correctly interpreted and implemented, trust assets are properly
invested, receipts and expenditures are properly allocated between
the principal and income accounts, compensation taken by the
trustee is reasonable, etc. This waiver language likely will soon appear in the boilerplate provisions of most of the will-drafting forms
available to lawyers and the public, and be copied as a part of
every will by novice drafters, sometimes blindly (because the boilerplate is not read) and other times unaware of the potential consequences (because they are not known by the drafter). Accordingly, waiver will likely become a standard part of many wills.
Although the waiver legislation will undoubtedly achieve its intended goal in most of the testamentary trusts administered by
professionals, the price for this victory will be expensive. The Commonwealth will suffer many instances where the waiver will result
in errors by an honest trustee going undetected, and thus uncorrected, and the creation of a tempting environment for a trustee
who might not be so honest.4"
4. Optional Form for Testamentary Trustees. Section 26-17.8
provides for a simplified form that may be used by a testamentary
trustee who must make accounts before the commissioner. 49 How-

ever, a trustee has no right to use this form. It may only be used if
the local commissioner or court is willing to accept it. It is difficult
47. Ironically, the reason for the 1993 legislation shortening the first accounting period for
guardians, curators, committees, trustees for ex-service persons and their beneficiaries, and
receivers for minor married women, from one year to four months was the general lack of
knowledge of the consumers who regularly filled these positions and the errors that they
naturally made. It was believed that shortening the period would enable the commissioner
to catch these errors earlier, when they might be more easily corrected, and also provide the
commissioner an opportunity for such education of these fiduciaries as might be required.
The reasoning behind that change, with which the writer agrees, is totally inconsistent with
complete waiver of accountings by testamentary trustees.
48. It is no answer to say that any beneficiary can require accountings to be made at any
time. First, only certain adult beneficiaries will be made aware of this right. Second, the
only beneficiaries who do receive notice are often not going to understand the process, or be
aware of the problems, any more than the trustee, and thus they are not likely to appreciate
the need for, or benefit of, a formal accounting.
49. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993 Va. Acts 969 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.8
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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to understand why the General Assembly chose to make this matter a local option.
5. Vouchers and payments. Section 26-17.9(A) continues the provisions of former section 26-17 regarding the fiduciary's display of
vouchers for disbursements, and a statement of cash on hand and
investments as a part of the accounting process.50 Section 2617.9(B) continues the provisions of former section 26-17.2,51 dealing with disbursements to beneficiaries by bank transfers to their
accounts. 52 Section 26-17.9(C) continues the provisions of former
section 26-17.1,53 dealing with payments to the Internal Revenue
54
Service by wire transfer.

6. Miscellaneous. Section 26-17.10(A) continues the provisions of
former section 26-17 5 regarding the commissioner's (i) power to
require an accounting fiduciary to exhibit the securities the fiduciary claims to hold and bank statements verifying cash on hand as
of the account's terminal date, and (ii) duty to state, settle and
report the fiduciary's account to the court. 6 Section 26-17.10(B)
imposes a duty on a deceased fiduciary's personal representative to
make any required accounting on behalf of the decedent unless the
same is made by the decedent's successor fiduciary.5
E. Statement in Lieu of Accounting
One obvious reason for requiring a personal representative of a
decedent's estate to file an accounting with the commissioner of
accounts is to create a record of the personal representative's actions for the benefit of the decedent's successors. However, in a
case where the personal representative is also the sole successor to
the decedent's estate there is clearly no need for the creation of
this record. Recognizing this reality in the case posed, as well as in
certain other cases where there was a similar identity between personal representatives and distributees or residuary legatees, section
26-20.1 has allowed such personal representatives (if there are no
more than three) to file a simple affidavit in lieu of the normal
50. Id. (codified at VA.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CODE ANN. § 26-17.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
(repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.2) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.9(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
(repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.9(C) (Cur. Supp. 1993)).
(repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.10(A) (Cur. Supp. 1993)).
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.10(B) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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final accounting. 8 The 1993 amendments to section 26-20.1 (i)
eliminate any attempt to specifically describe various situations in
which the affidavit might be used, (ii) abolish the restriction that
there be no more than three personal representatives, and (iii) increase the commissioner's fee for inspecting an affidavit from fifty
to seventy-five dollars. 9 As amended, this procedure is now available in cases where "all distributees of a decedent's estate or all residuary beneficiaries under a decedent's will are personal representatives of that decedent's estate, whether serving alone or with
one or more others :who are not distributees or residuary beneficiaries."8 0 This broadened language does not require that all personal representatives be distributees or residuary beneficiaries,
only that all distributees or residuary beneficiaries be personal representatives. Thus, for example, the affidavit may now be used in a
case where A is the sole beneficiary, but A and B (perhaps the testator's attorney) are the personal representatives."1
F. Payment of Insolvent Decedent's Debts
When the assets under the control of a personal representative
are insufficient to satisfy all claims against the decedent's estate,
section 64.1-57 determines the order and priority amount in which
the claims are to be paid.2 The 1993 amendment adds to the list,
as a class five priority, claims by nursing homes not to exceed four
hundred dollars. 3
58. The contents of this affidavit, as slightly reworded in the 1993 version, are "that all
known charges against the estate have been paid, and that after the time required by law,
the residue of the estate has been delivered to the distributees or beneficiaries." Act of Mar.
24, 1993, ch. 525, 1993 Va. Acts 647 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp.
1993)). "In the case of a residuary beneficiary, the statement shall be accompanied by
proper vouchers showing satisfaction of all other bequests in the will." Id.
59. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).

60. Id.
61. Curiously, if A in this example was a nonresident, and B was appointed a personal
representative pursuant to the general rule of VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Repl. Vol. 1992) requiring a nonresident fiduciary to have a resident co-fiduciary, the affidavit process would
have been available to A and B under prior law. However, it would not have been available
if they were both residents.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-157 (Repl. Vol. 1991).

63. Act of Mar. 17, 1993, ch. 259, 1993 Va. Acts 290 (codified at VA.
157.5 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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G. Trustee's Power to Invade Trust
Section 64.1-67.2, dealing with the construction of a trustee's
power to invade the principal of a trust, was added to the code in
1988,4 amended in 1991,5 and amended again in 1992.66 Both the

1991 and 1992 amendments provided that they were declaratory of
existing law. 7 The original 1988 enactment was believed to be declaratory of existing law but the enacting legislation did not so
state. Because of this omission, it would be possible to construe (i)
the 1988 legislation as prospective from its effective date of July 1,
1988 and (ii) the 1991 and 1992 amendments as declaratory of the
law only from that same date, with resulting adverse federal transfer tax consequences. The 1993 legislation cures the 1988 oversight
by amending and reenacting Chapter 346
of the 1988 Acts of As68
sembly as "declaratory of existing law."

H. Revocation of Death Benefits Upon Divorce
Following a divorce, it would be unusual for either party to wish
to continue the other in any beneficiary relationship. Accordingly,
the legislature has enacted laws giving expression to the normal

70
intent of the parties in the case of wills, 69 survivorship tenancies

and multiple party accounts. 1 New section 20-111.112 fills an im64. Act of Mar. 29, 1988, ch. 346, 1988 Va. Acts 417. For a discussion of this statute, see J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 22 U. RICH. L.
REV. 759, 764-66 (1988).
65. Act of Mar. 20, 1991, ch. 432, 1991 Va. Acts 1263. For a discussion of this amendment,
see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 925, 927-28 (1991).
66. Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch. 832, 1992 Va. Acts 1492. For a discussion of this amendment,
see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U.
RICH. L. REV. 873, 894 (1992).
67. Act of Mar. 20, 1991, ch. 432, 1991 Va. Acts 1263, cl.2, and Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch.
832, 1992 Va. Acts 1492, cl.2.
68. Act of Mar. 24, 1993, ch. 524, 1993 Va. Acts 647, cl.2.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-59 (Repl. Vol. 1991) generally provides that divorce or annulment revokes all beneficial provisions in a testator's will in favor of testator's former spouse.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1990) provides for divorce to eliminate all survivorship rights in spousal tenancies in realty or personalty, and for the conversion of a tenancy by the entirety to be converted into a tenancy in common.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.4 (Repl. Vol. 1988) provides for the termination of all rights
of married persons in multiple party accounts, including survivorship, upon their divorce.
Interestingly, although all four of the statutes referred to in this article apply to a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii,the multiple party account statute is the only one that expressly applies
to a divorce a mensa et thoro. In addition, the multiple party account statute and the survivorship tenancy statute do not expressly apply in case of an annulment.
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portant gap in this collection of intent, effectuating statutes by revoking revocable beneficiary designations of death benefits73 in
favor of one's spouse upon divorce or annulment. 74 The statute further provides (i) that a covered death benefit will pass as if the
former spouse died first (ii) for the protection of one who pays a
covered death benefit to a former spouse without having received
prior written notice of the revocation and (iii) that it is not applicable "to any trust or any death benefit payable to or under any
trust. 7 56
Although the remedy of section 20-111.1 is expressly restricted
to cases where the decree of divorce or annulment is entered on or
after July 1, 1993, it is applicable to insurance policies or other
death benefits issued or contracted for prior to that date. In this
regard, however, a recent federal case7 6 concluded that a similar
Oklahoma statute was "an unconstitutional impairment of contracts insofar as it applied to insurance contracts entered before
the statute became effective," 7 7 under the contracts clause of the
United States Constitution..7 This decision is poorly reasoned because, among other things, it fails to take into account the dual
nature of an insurance policy (that it is in part a contract, and in
part a gift, and the fact that the contractual element, the insurance
company's obligation to pay upon the insured's death is not affected by the statute).7 9 As a result of the decision's poor reasoning, the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code has
issued a four-point rebuttal statement in which it states that "the
72. Act of Mar. 22, 1993, ch. 417, 1993 Va. Acts 487 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1
(Cur.Supp. 1993)).
73. "The term 'death benefit' includes any payments under a life insurance contract, annuity, retirement arrangement, compensation agreement or other contract designating a
beneficiary of any right, property or money in the form of a death benefit." VA. CODE ANN..
§ 20-111.1 (Cu. Supp. 1993).
74. "This section shall not apply (i) to the extent a decree of annulment or divorce from
the bond of matrimony, or a written agreement of the parties provides for a contrary result
V. CODE ANN. § 20.1-111.1 (Cu . Supp. 1993).
as to specific death benefits . ." V
75. Id. at § 20.1-111.1 (ii).
76. Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 1324.
78. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
79. Note that the same dual relationship exists in the case of a multiple party account
where a depositor contracts with a financial institution for monies to be paid to a beneficiary or survivor at the depositor's death. This dual nature of multiple party accounts is
discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, and P.O.D. Bank Accounts; Virginia
Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RicH. L. REv. 41 (1973), and receives
legislative recognition in VA.CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.2 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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Ritter opinion is manifestly wrong,"8 0 and then proceeds to
demonstrate the accuracy of its statement.8 1
I. Acquisition of Property by Aliens
Prior to 1993, the full text of section 55-1 was "(a)ny alien, not
an enemy, s2 may acquire by purchase 3 or descent and hold real
estate in this state; and the same shall be transmitted in the same
manner as real estate held by citizens."8 4 Although the issue of
aliens, whether enemies or friends, taking by testate or intestate
succession goes back to the common law, the debate concerning
alien friends developed a new intensity during the period of the
Cold War between America and communist countries. The legislative responses to the problems associated with alien friends were of
two types: (i) retention statutes that focused on the right of the
alien friend to retain the inherited property instead of it passing to
the state, and (ii) reciprocity statutes that determined the alien
friend's right to take as a function of an American's right to take
under the law of the alien's country. In Zschernig v. Miller,85 the
United States Supreme Court held Oregon's combination retention/reciprocity statute unconstitutional because of its potential
intrusion into the United State's conduct of foreign affairs.
80. Joint EditorialBoard Statement Regarding the Constitutionalityof Changes in Default Rules as Applied to Pre-ExistingDocuments, 17 AM. C. T&. & EST. COUNs. NOTES 184
(1991). Copies of this statement may be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago, Illinois
60611. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in our Multiple MarriageSociety, 26 RAL
PROP. PROB. AND Ta J. 683 (1992) discusses this issue at 699-701. Footnote 45, on page 700,
notes the existence of a further article, S. Alan Medlin, Joint Editorial Board Rebukes
Eighth Circuit Decision, PROB.PRAC. REP., Jan. 1992, at 1, which was not available to the
writer in the preparation of this article.
81. Joint Editorial Board Statement, supra note 80, at 184.
82. The identity of an "alien enemy," which was relatively clear in World War H, would
not have been so clear more recently in regard to citizens of North Korea, North Vietnam,
or Iraq.
83. "Purchase" is not limited to transactions of purchase and sale. In this context, a "purchaser" is simply one who takes by deed or will (the "words of purchase" identifying the
taker, and the "words of limitation" describing the estate taken) whether that deed or will
be gratuitous or for a consideration. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 31-32 (1962).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-1 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
85. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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The 1993 amendment to section 55-1s8 makes it a reciprocity
statute which appears to be confined to personal property.8 7 However, instead of a Virginia court's finding of a lack of reciprocity
resulting in the forfeiture of the alien's right to take, the court
making such a finding "may direct the money or property to be
paid into the court for the benefit of the alien." ' This property
must be paid out upon order of the impounding court or "a court
of competent jurisdiction."8 9 Any property still retained by the impounding court three years from the decedent's death9" "shall be
paid out by the court as if the alien had predeceased the decedent." 91 Thus, if the deemed predeceased alien has descendants,
they will be the takers if decedent died intestate. 2 The descendants will be the presumptive takers if the decedent died testate,
and the alien is a grandparent or a descendant of a grandparent of
the decedent. 3 The steps to be taken at this point are unclear if
these descendants are similarly aliens, as is the constitutional reception to be accorded this statute. In this latter regard, interested
parties will find that numerous law review articles have been writ94
ten on this general topic.
J.

Transfers for Religious Purposes

Former section 57-7,95 dealing with transfers for religious purposes, was rewritten by the legislature in 1993 in order to clarify its
intent and simplify its language,9" and reenacted as section 5786. Act of Mar. 24, 1993, ch. 535, 1993 Va. Acts 657 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
87. This is somewhat curious because the statute's original language dealing with alien
enemies, quoted in the text accompanying notes 80-82, is concerned with real property only.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-1 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
89. Id. It is unclear what other court the language refers to.
90. In some cases more than three years will pass from the decedent's death before the
property is available for distribution (i.e., payment into court) by the personal
representative.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-1 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
92. Id. § 64.1-1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
93. Id.
94. For a survey of federal and state policies regarding aliens and estate matters see
Rights and Restrictions on Interests' of Aliens in U.S. Estates: Federal and State Laws
Affecting Administrationand Distributionof U.S. Estates in Which Aliens Hold Interests,
15 REAL PROP. PROB & Ta. J. 659 (1980).
95. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, ch. 370, 1993 Va. Acts 420 (repealing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7
(Repl. Vol. 1986)).
96. This section consisted of three sentences, containing 232 words, 216 words, and 30
words, respectively. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (Repl. Vol. 1986). It is discussed in J. Rodney
Johnson, Virginia Laws Affecting Churches - Restated, 17 U. RicH. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1982).
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7.1. 97 The new section, which was passed as declaratory of existing
law,9 8 continues (i) to validate all gratuitous and nongratuitous inter vivos and testamentary conveyances and transfers of realty and
personalty to church entities, "subject to the provisions of § 5712," (ii) to provide that any transfer not stating a specific purpose
will be held for the religious and benevolent purposes of the
church entity, and (iii) to prohibit the failure of any transfer because the beneficiaries are insufficiently designated, if the church
entity has trustees or ecclesiastical officers, or is capable of securing the appointment of trustees."9
K.

Death -

Tolling of Statute of Limitations

Section 8.01-229(B), dealing with the effect that death of a party
has on the running of the statute of limitations, provides for four
instances where the statute will not run until the latter of (i) the
expiration of the statute of limitations on the underlying claim, or
(ii) one year (or two in one instance) after the qualification of the
appropriate personal representative. 00 In order to prevent the manipulation of these rules by refusing to qualify a personal representative for a significant period of time, this section has further provided that, if not actually qualified earlier, a personal
representative will be deemed to have qualified the day before the
first anniversary of the decedent's death for the purpose of these
rules. 10 1 The 1993 amendment changes this period to the day
02
before the second anniversary of the decedent's death.1
In a case where plaintiff, unaware of defendant's death, brings a
personal action against defendant instead of defendant's personal
representative, section 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) has permitted plaintiff to
substitute decedent's personal representative as party defendant
97. Act of Mar. 19, 1993, ch. 370, 1993 Va. Acts 421 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
98. Id. at § 57-7.1(2).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993). Code of Virginia § 57-12 imposes limits
on the amount of real and personal property that may be owned by a church entity. VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-12 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
100. Id. § 8.01-229(B)(1) (Death of person entitled to bring a personal action) (one year);
-229(B)(2)(a) (Death of person against whom personal action may be brought) (one year); 229(B)(4) (Accrual of a personal cause of action against the estate of any person subsequent
to such person's death) (two years); and -229(B)(5) (Accrual of a personal cause of action in
favor of decedent) (one year).
101. Id. § 8.01-229(B)(6) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
102. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 844, 1993 Va. Acts 1223 (codified at VA CODE ANN. § 8.01229(B)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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before the latter of (i) the expiration of the statute of limitations
on the underlying claim, or (ii) one year after the date the suit
papers were filed with the court.10 3 The 1993 amendment increases
the latter of these periods from one year to two years.104
L. Medicaid
In response to a 1991 legislative request, 0 5 the Joint Legislative
Audit and Review Commission issued a fifty-eight-page report on
November 24, 1992, recommending certain changes in Virginia
medicaid law. 06 Because of a belief that the length of the report
and the complexity of the law would not allow sufficient time for
interested parties to study its recommendations in the short interval before the commencement of the 1993 legislative session, an ad
hoc group identified as "Virginia Elder Law Attorneys"'107 requested the General Assembly to defer action on these recommendations until 1994. Although this request was supported by an
eleven-page critical response to the report,' and was endorsed by
the Virginia Bar Association, most of the report's recommendations were enacted by the legislature. Although space limitations
and the nature of this survey preclude a discussion of the report
and the response, and an analysis of the new legislation, the latter
will be noted for the convenience of the reader. The three new additions to the Code were section 32.1-325.01, Certain term life insurance considered resources; 0 9 section 32.1-326.1, Department to
operate program of estate recovery; 11 and section 55-19.5, Provi103. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
104. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 844, 1993 Va. Acts 1223 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01229(B)(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
105. S.J. Res. No. 91, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1991). Requesting the Commission
on Health Care for All Virginians (to study the issue of property transfer for purposes of

medicaid eligibility).
106. S. Doc. 10, MEDICAID ASSET TRANsFERs AND ESTATE RECOVERY, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 1993).
107. The shared characteristic of these attorneys, who represented the private, public and
academic sectors, was their membership in the National Association of Elder Law Attorneys. The author was a member of this group.
108. Virginia Elder Law Attorneys Respond to Senate Document No. 10 - White Paper
on JLARC Study -- Medicaid Asset Transfers and Estate Recovery. A copy of this document'and a copy of the Resolution requesting deferral until 1994 are on file in the offices of
the University of Richmond Law Review.
109. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 990, 1993 Va. Acts 1626 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1325.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993)). This was passed as emergency legislation. Id. at cl. 2.
110. Duplicate bills were passed and enacted. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 966, 1993 Va. Acts
1582 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-326.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993)) (Senate version) is Act of
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sion in certain trust void."' The only amendment was to section
63.1-133.1, No lien to attach to property of applicant or recipient;

112
release of existing unforeclosed liens.

III. 1992-93
A.

Executors -

JUDICIAL

OPINIONS

Power of Sale

In Yamada v. McLeod, l ls decedent's duly probated will left her
residuary estate to her daughters, named them as her executors,
and stated in part "I grant unto my Executor . . . the full power
and authority to sell . . . . any real property which I may own at
the time of my death.
...11 Acting in their capacity as execu-

tors, the daughters sold certain real estate and conveyed the same
by deed in which their husbands did not join. When purchaser
later attempted to sell this property it was claimed that, as the
daughters were also residuary beneficiaries, they also needed to execute the deed in such capacity and their husbands had to join
therein in order to release their contingent curtesy claims. 115 Citing

prior law for the proposition that the daughters' exercise of their
naked power of sale in their capacity as executors divested the
daughters' rights as beneficiaries, the Supreme Court also concluded that "(b)ecause the daughters' title was divested during
their lifetimes, they no longer had interests in the property to
'6
which their husbands' derivative curtesy interests could attach.""
Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 700, 1993 Va. Acts 981 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-326.01 (Cue.
Supp. 1993)) (House version).
111. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 701, 1993 Va. Acts 981 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.5
(Cure. Supp. 1993)).
112. Duplicate bills were passed and enacted. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 989, 1993 Va. Acts
1625 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-133.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)) (Senate version); Act of
Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 953, 1993 Va. Acts 1541 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-133.1 (Cune.
Supp. 1993)) (House version).
113. 243 Va. 426, 416 S.E.2d 222 (1992). For an additional discussion of this case see L.
Charles Long, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Property Law, 27 UNIV. RICH. L. REV.
805, 816 (1993).
114. Id. at 428, 416 S.E.2d at 223.
115. All claims to dower and curtesy were abolished effective January 1, 1991, except for
those vested prior to that date, by Acts of Apr. 9, 1990, ch. 831 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-19.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991)). In the instant case the decedent died in 1988 and the daughters' sale was made in 1989. Yamada, 243 Va. at 428, 416 S.E.2d at 233.
116. Yamada, 243 Va. at 431, 416 S.E.2d at 225 (emphasis added) (citing George L. Haskins, The Defeasability of Dower, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 826, 833 (1950)).
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Interpretation -

Intent

The issue in Yancey v. Scales,117 concerned the proper disposition of $50,000 in insurance proceeds on testator's life which, for
lack of a specific beneficiary, was payable to testator's estate. As
testator's forty-one-clause will neither made an express disposition
of these proceeds, nor contained an express residuary clause, testator's distributees claimed these proceeds as intestate property.
However, the trial court held that clause 16118 of the will operated
as a residuary clause and awarded the proceeds to the legatees
thereunder. The supreme court reversed, holding that
[testator] expressly limited the bequest to '[a]ll the money I have
Thus, her intention, as determined by what
left in any bank,' ......
she actually said, is clear, and we cannot give her words a different
meaning simply because there are common-law presumptions
against intestacy and in favor of a residuary disposition.'n

C.

Validity of Unlimited Non-General Power of Appointment

The issue before the court in Leach v. Hyatt 20 was "the validity
of a clause in a will which gives the executor absolute discretion to
dispose of the testator's property, provided that he does not use it
to enlarge his own bequest under the will.' 12 ' Although Virginia
has accepted the validity of a special power of appointment, 2 2 and
117. 244 Va. 300, 421 S.E.2d 195 (1992).
118. "In clause SIXTEENTH, (testator) stated that '[a]ll the money I have left in any
bank, after the payment of all of my debts and funeral expenses and administrative expenses and the above bequests, shall be equally divided among [the legatees]."' Id. at 302,
421 S.E.2d at 195.
119. Id. at 303, 421 S.E.2d at 196.
120. 244 Va. 566, 423 S.E.2d 165 (1992).
121. Id. at 567, 423 S.E.2d at 167. The portion of the clause in question reads as follows:
In the absence of full and complete instructions from me to my Executor or Executrix, the persons to receive something under this Clause H and what each is to receive
shall be appointed by my Executor or Executrix in his or her sole and absolute discretion, consistent with the stated objective of this Clause II, but this limited power of
appointment shall not be used to increase or enlarge any bequest I make to any persons who serve as my Executor or Executrix, by this will or any codicil to it.
Id. at 568, 423 S.E.2d at 167.
122. A special power arises when the donee has a power to appoint within a specified class
which does not include the donee or the donee's creditors. Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159
S.E. 209 (1931).
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a general power of appointment, 2 ' the supreme court had never
ruled on the validity of the present "limited" power of appointment.12 4 The majority rule invalidates such powers, generally "on
the grounds that such powers lack definite beneficiaries.' 125 However, the supreme court concluded that "the minority approach, in
examining whether the donor unambiguously expressed an intent
to create a limited power of appointment, provides the better analytic framework for ascertaining the donor's intended disposition
of his property."'' 26 Applying this test to the facts of the present
case, the court found that testator's language demonstrated a clear
intent to confer a limited power upon the donee and therefore up12
held the validity of the power.
D.

Wills

-

Interpretation-

Intent

In West v. Hines, 2 8 the testator left an estate of $690,012.00, a
holographic will, and six holographic codicils, thereby tending to
guarantee the ensuing litigation to construe various provisions and
determine testator's intent. In this factual inquiry, the court applied settled principles of law in upholding the trial court's
decision. 12 9
E.

Wills -

Disclaimer

In paragraph Fifth of the will examined in Roseberry v.
Moncure,"s° the testator devised approximately five-hundred acres
of real property to the Humane Society of the United States
(HSUS) "for the purpose of establishing a wildlife refuge."'' The
paragraph further provided that, if HSUS attempted to "transfer,
alienate or otherwise convey any title or interest in any of the
123. A general power arises when the power given to the donee enables the donee to appoint to himself or his creditors. Shriners Hosp. v. Citizens Bank, 198 Va. 130, 92 S.E.2d 503
(1956).
124. The power in this case is most often referred to as a "non-general" power, a nomenclature accepted by the American Law Institute in RESTATEMENT .(SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 11.4 (1986).
125. 244 Va. 566, 570, 423 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1992).
126. Id. at 570, 423 S.E.2d at 168.
127. Id. at 566, 423 S.E.2d at 169.
128. 245 Va. 379, 429 S.E.2d 1 (1993).
129. The major portion of the decision focused on testator's intended meaning of the verb
"reduced," which the court noted "has at least 14 definitions." Id. at 384, 429 S.E.2d at 3.
130. 245 Va. 436, 429 S.E.2d 4 (1993). The author has discussed this case with counsel for
the executor but has no financial interest therein.
131. Id. at 437, 429 S.E.2d at 5.
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property, '132 the testator's executor was authorized to convey the
same to another entity in order to accomplish testator's primary
goal. The trial court held that, upon HSUS' disclaimer of this devise, the executor was authorized to convey the same in accordance
with the provisions of the will.
Quoting from Professor Scott, 3 3 and citing the Restatement,'
the supreme court held that "the beneficial interest in the real
property did not vest in HSUS because when it disclaimed the
property, the disclaimer operated retroactively.1 3 5 Thus, as the
property had never vested in HSUS, the court concluded that
HSUS could not have "attempted to transfer, alienate, or otherwise convey any title or interest in the real property. Thus, [the
36
executor] is not authorized to convey the real property.'
In this case, the court referred to HSUS as the "beneficiary"
under paragraph Fifth and decided the case under authority focusing on a disclaimer by a "beneficiary." However, if, as it facially
appears, paragraph Fifth of testator's will created a charitable
trust, then the court's description of HSUS as a "beneficiary" was
wrong, as was its reliance on the rules applicable to private trusts.
When one makes a gift to a charitable entity, the beneficiary is the
public - not the charity. 13 7 The position of the donee-charity
132. Id. at 429 S.E.2d at 4. The full text of what the court referred to as the "relevant
part" of paragraph Fifth reads as follows:
In the event that HSUS violates the above terms and conditions, or in the event that
the HSUS attemps [sic] to transfer, alienate or otherwise convey any title or interest
in any of the property, then I authorize my Executors, or if they be not living, a court
of competent jurisdiction, to convey all of the said real property under the terms and
conditions as hereinabove set forth unto any corporation, organization or institution
capable and willing to maintain said property as a wildlife refuge. It is my expressed
intention that all of my real property be treated as one parcel, except as otherwise
specifically stated herein, regardless of source of title.
Id.
133. The quoted language reads as follows:
If a trust is created without notice to the beneficiary or the beneficiary has not accepted the beneficial interest under the trust, he can disclaim. Although the beneficial
interest vests in him without his knowledge or consent, he cannot be compelled to
retain it. The effect of his disclaimer is to put him in the same position as though the
beneficial interest had never vested in him, his disclaimer operating retroactively.
Id. at 439, 429 S.E.2d at 6 (1993) (quoting 1 W.LIAM F. FRATCHER AND AUSTIN V. SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 36.1, pp. 389-92 (4th ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted)).

134. 245 Va. 430, 439, 429 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1993) citing
§ 36 (1959)).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. "In the case of a charitable trust the beneficial interest is not given to individual
beneficiaries, but the property is devoted to the accomplishment of purposes that are benefi-
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(HSUS) in such a case is that of trustee, holding and using the
property to the donor's end. When the trustee of an intended charitable trust disclaims, "although it relieves the trustee of liability,
'
[it] does not destroy the trust."138
Even if testator's will did not create a charitable trust, it still
appears that the court relied upon the wrong authority. It is very
clear from the language of paragraph Fifth that HSUS was not to
take a beneficial interest in testator's real estate."' A fair reading
of the will indicates that HSUS was to use the property solely to
accomplish testator's purpose and, if it didn't, it was to be replaced
by one who would. Thus, even if paragraph Fifth created a private
trust, the role of HSUS was not that of beneficiary but that of
trustee. Accordingly, the court's authority and discussion relating
to the consequences of a disclaimer by a beneficiary is incorrect. In
the case of a private trust, "[i]f the trustee named in the will disclaims, the court will appoint a new trustee to administer the
trust. 4 '
Lastly, the court's interpretation of testator's intent in this case
is regrettably narrow. The accomplishment of a particular purpose
was clearly paramount to testator. In furtherance of this purpose,
testator provided for selection of a new trustee if HSUS should
' the property.
attempt to "transfer, alienate or otherwise convey"141
What was meant by "otherwise convey" in this context? Testator
could easily have used this language to mean "or any other action
of HSUS that results in it not holding title to this property." ' 2
The supreme court recognized that, in will interpretation cases,
"[w]hen the words are arguably ambiguous

. .

. [t]he relative

merits of the inferences urged must be weighed and the conflict
cial or supposed to be beneficial to the community . . ." FRATCHER, supra note 133, at
§ 364, p. 108. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 36 (1959).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 354, com. a. (1959). Accord, FRATCHER, supra
note 133, at § 354, p. 59. The ultimate destiny of property that is disclaimed by a charitable
corporation is discussed in Id. at § 397.3, p. 419.
139. Indeed, the court found that the property was devised to HSUS "for the purpose of
establishing a wildlife refuge." 245 Va. at 437, 429 S.E.2d at 5 (1993).
140.
TRUSTS

FRATCHER,

supra note 133, at § 35, p. 385. Accord,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

§ 35 (1959).

141. 245 Va. at 437, 429 S.E.2d at 5 (1993) (emphasis added).
142. In addition, although it must be admitted that a disclaimer is not a de jure transfer,
a disclaimer is nevertheless regularly referred to as a de facto transfer.
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resolved by a disinterested arbiter.

'143

Nevertheless the court

concluded:
The language the testator chose to use in paragraph Fifth is subject
to only one interpretation and is free of all doubt. The testator simproperty
ply did not give the executor authority to convey the real 144
to another entity in the event HSUS chose to disclaim it.

It is difficult to understand how the court could conclude that the
language "or otherwise convey," in the context of testator's will, is
not "arguably ambiguous," but instead, is "free of all doubt" and
"subject to only one interpretation." This construction could be
defended in a case dealing ith the interpretation of a bilateral
contract where, because of the conflicting interests of the parties,
of a will, where the intent
an objective theory prevails. In the case
1 45
of the testator is sovereign, it cannot.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As in 1992, the 1993 session produced more than the normal volume of will, trust, and estate-related legislation. Some of this legislation was constitutionally required. Other was consumer intenteffectuating, lawyer's technical work for the common good, medicaid-reactive, or constituent response. Most of it was good. The
major problem was the statute authorizing waiver of accountings
by testamentary trustees. This provision will result in significant
injury to numerous persons not in a position to protect themselves
therefrom.

143. 245 Va. at 439, 429 S.E.2d at 6 (1993) (quoting Powell v. Holland, 224 Va. 609, 613-

14, 299 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1983)).
144. Id. at 440, 429 S.E.2d at 6.

145. Although the supreme court reversed the chancellor's decree, it did not enter final
judgment. Id. The case was remanded to the trial court where, the author understands,
proceedings continue at the date of this article.

